Civil Rights Act of 1991 -- Employer Liability for Punitive Damages in Title VII Claims by Banks, Angela M.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1999
Civil Rights Act of 1991 -- Employer Liability for
Punitive Damages in Title VII Claims
Angela M. Banks
William & Mary Law School, ambank@wm.edu
Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Banks, Angela M., "Civil Rights Act of 1991 -- Employer Liability for Punitive Damages in Title VII Claims" (1999). Faculty
Publications. 307.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/307
HeinOnline -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 359 1999-2000
19991 THE SUPREME COURT- LEADING CASES 359 
the governance of a massive administrative undertaking is at stake, 
open discussion of the individual focus or group orientation of one's 
opinions may help prevent an innocuous choice of words from trig-
gering a real-world anomaly. 
C. Civil Rights Acts 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991 -Employer Liability for Punitive Dam-
ages in Title VII Claims. -The Civil Rights Act of 19911 ("the 1991 
Act") expanded the remedies available for violations of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 19642 ("Title Vll") to deter intentional discrimina-
tion more effectively.3 The 1991 Act subjected employers who are 
found guilty of intentional employment discrimination to compensa-
tory and possible punitive damages in addition to the equitable relief 
already available under Title VII.4 Last Term, in Kolstad v. American 
Dental Ass'n,5 the Supreme Court determined the circumstances under 
which a court may award punitive damages under Title Vll. The 
Court ruled that to obtain punitive damages a plaintiff must demon-
strate that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to 
her federally protected rights, rather than with egregiousness, the 
higher standard imposed by the District of Columbia Circuit. This 
holding accurately interpreted Congress's intended standard for puni-
tive damages. The Court went on to state, however, that employers 
will not be vicariously liable for punitive damages when the discrimi-
natory employment decisions of managerial agents are made contrary 
to the employer's "good-faith efforts to comply with Title Vll."6 Yet 
the ·Court did not define what constitutes such efforts. 7 By allowing 
to change "the behavior of a whole society'~; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191-93 (1986) (asserting a tension between "policing" of in-
dividual infractions and "associational forms of regulation," which require sustained involvement 
in group activities); cf }AMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7 (1938) (describ-
ing the rise in "administrative process" as a result of "the growing interdependence of individuals 
in our civilization"); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12-25 (1998) (arguing that the "regulatory state" is a response to 
problems of collective action). 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 
42 u.s.c. (1994»· 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-2oooe-17 (1994). 
3 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pl 1, at 14 (1991). The 1991 Act also made punitive damages 
available for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ I2IOI-I22I3 (1994). 
4 See Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 198ra (1994). 
s 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999). 
6 /d. at 2129 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Tate),]., dissenting)). 
7 See E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Nos. 98-2015, 98-2030, 1999 WL 638210, AT •6 (1oth 
Cir. 1999) ("Kolstad provides us no definitive standard for determining what constitutes good-
faith compliance."). In Wal-Mart, the Tenth Circuit applied the Kolstad ruling to a case involving 
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employers to avoid' punitive liability for their agents' unlawful behav-
ior without establishing a clear good-faith-effort standard, the Court 
rendered Title Vll's most powerful deterrent mechanism - punitive 
damages - ineffectual. 
Carole Kolstad served as the Director of Federal Agency Relations 
in the Washington, D.C. office of the American Dental Association 
(ADA).8 Tom Spangler was the Legislative Counsel in the same of-
fice.9 In September 1992, Jack O'Donnell announced that he was re-
tiring both as Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and as Di-
rector of the Council on Government Affairs and Federal Dental 
Services, the second-highest position in their office. 10 In the fall, both 
Kolstad and Spangler formally applied for 0 'Donnell's position. 11 
Both had worked directly with O'Donnell and had received "distin-
guished" performance ratings. 12 In December 1992, the ADA notified 
Kolstad that it had chosen Spangler as O'Donnell's replacement. 13 
Kolstad brought an action under Title Vll in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that in selecting 
Spangler to succeed O'Donnell, the ADA had intentionally discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of sex. 14 The jury found in Kolstad's 
favor and awarded her $52,718 in damages, which represented the ad-
ditional pay that she would have received had she been chosen to re-
place O'Donnell. 15 The jury did not consider awarding Kolstad puni-
tive damages because the judge had not instructed it on the issue. 16 
Kolstad moved for ·additional equitable relief in the form of instate-
ment to 0 'Donnell's position with the ADA. 17 The court denied this 
punitive damages for a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994). 
8 See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 960. 
9 See id. 
10 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 912 F. Supp. 13-14 (1996). 
14 See id. Kolstad based her claim of unlawful discrimination on an assertion of disparate 
treatment, which is significant because only disparate treatment claims are eligible for punitive 
damage awards. See 42 U.S.C. § 198Ja (1994). A plaintiff claiming disparate treatment must 
show the following: that the plaintiff is a woman, that the plaintiff was refused a position for 
which she applied and was qualified, and that the employer filled the position with a man. See 
Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1436. After a plaintiff has made this prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the employer-defendant to rebut the plaintiff's claim with evidence of legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for its decision. See id. If this burden is satisfied, then the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer's reasons were pretexts for unlawful discrimina-
tion. See id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4II U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating the 
elements necessary to prove racial discrimination). 
15 See Kolstad, 912 F. Supp at 14. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
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motion because, despite the jury verdict, the court did not believe that 
Kolstad had actually proved unlawful sex discrimination. 18 
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. 19 The court of appeals held that the dis-
trict court had erred in not instructing the jury on punitive damages. 20 
The ADA argued that Congress intended only for . plaintiffs in "ex-
traordinarily egregious cases" to recover punitive damages. 21 Writing 
for the Court, Judge Tatel rejected the ADA's argument and endorsed 
Kolstad's argument that the standard of proof for punitive damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as the standard under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1983.22 Judge Williams dissented from the finding on pu-
nitive damages, arguing that the minimum standard of evidence for 
punitive damages should be higher than the standard.{ or liability. 23 
The District of Columbia Circuit granted an en bane rehearing on 
the punitive damages issue, and the court adopted Judge Williams's 
position,24 holding that a plaintiff could be awarded punitive damages 
only upon a showing of egregious behavior. 25 Finding that Kolstad did 
not demonstrate that her employer acted egregiously, the court af-
firmed the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on punitive dam-
18 See id. at 15-16. The ADA had moved to overturn the jury verdict as a matter of law, but 
the court denied the motion. See id. at 13. The court found that the verdict could not be over-
turned because under Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995), a jury's decision to 
infer unlawful discrimination solely based on a belief that the defendant-employer's explanations 
are simply pretextual is appropriate and cannot be overturned. See Kolstad, 912 F. Supp. at 15. 
19 Kolstad appealed the district court's decision not to instruct the jury on punitive damages, 
and the ADA appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
See Kolstad, 108 F. 3d at 1434. 
20 See id. 
21 I d. at 1437 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22 See id. at 1437-38. Punitive damages are awarded under section 1981 if the plaintiff proves 
that the defendant acted with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to the 
rights of the plaintiff. See id. Section 1981a's language tracks the standard of proof requirements 
for punitive damages under other civil rights statutes, including sections 1981 and 1983, and the 
court decided that if Congress had wanted courts to depart from the "well-established legal stan-
dards" for punitive damages, then it would have made that intent clear. I d. at 1437. 
23 See id. at 1440 (Williams, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Based on the com-
mon law analog of intentional discrimination- intentional torts- Judge Williams argued that 
punitive damages should be allowed only when the plaintiff has proven that the defendant acted 
with "a state of mind more extreme than what is required for the intentional tort on which the 
punitive claim is piggybacked." I d. at 1441-42. 
24 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. CrR. 1998). Judge Williams 
wrote for the court, and Judges Silberman, Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, and Randolph joined 
the opinion. In determining the standard for punitive damages under '42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the 
court was guided by the belief that the 1991 Act created a "two-tiered scheme of liability," in 
which punitive damages were not to be automatically available to all Title vn plaintiffs. Id. at 
961-62. The court read the 1991 Act's legislative history as indicating that Congress "intended to 
establish an egregiousness requirement for punitive damages." I d. at 965. 
25 See id. at 969. 
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ages.26 Judge Tatel dissented,27 arguing that because section I98Ia 
does not mention egregiousness, applying such a standard would con-
flict with the reckless indifference requirement of sections I 98 I and 
I983. 28 Judge Tatel maintained that because it was the court's duty to 
give effect "to every clause and word of [t~e] statute," the court could 
not ignore the reckless indifference standard or undermine it by 
adopting an egregiousness standard. 29 
The Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit's de-
cision and held that a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate egregious 
conduct to obtain punitive damages.30 Writing for the Court,31 Justice 
O'Connor determined that Congress intended to impose two standards 
of liability on employers found liable for intentional discrimination: 
one for compensatory damages and another, higher standard for puni-
tive damages.32 The Court held that section 1981a's required showing 
of "malice" or "reckless[ness]" stated the requisite higher standard for 
punitive damages.33 
Having rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's egregiousness 
standard, the majority proceeded to address an issue that the parties 
did not raise: "the proper legal standards for imputing liability to an 
employer in the punitive damages context."34 The Court concluded 
that employers cannot be vicariously liable for punitive damages for 
the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents when 
26 See id. 
27 Chief Judge Edwards and Judges Wald, Rogers, and Garland joined Judge Tatel's dissent. 
28 See Kolstad, I39 F.3d at 97 I (Tate!,]. , dissenting). 
29 /d. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. I54, I73 (I997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Judge Tate! also argued that the majority opinion failed to provide district courts with adequate 
guidance as to what constitutes egregiousness. See id. at 976-78. 
30 See Kolstad, I I9 S. Ct. at 2 I24, 2126. 
3l Part I of Justice O'Connor's opinion was unanimous. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Part IT-A of Justice O'Connor's opinion, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Part IT-B. Part IT-A considered the 
evidentiary standard necessary for obtaining punitive damages and Part 11-B discussed the condi-
tions under which employers can be vicariously liable for punitive damages. 
32 See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2I24. 
33 /d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § I98Ia(b)(I) (I994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The I99I 
Act's innovation was that it enabled plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages on the condition that 
the defendant-employer acted with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights 
of the plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § I98Ia(bXI). The "malice" and "reckless indifference" standards 
refer to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of Title vn, not that it may 
be engaging in discriminatory behavior. See id. The Court raised this distinction and noted that 
there are circumstances under which intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive 
damages because the employer is unaware that the discrimination is unlawful. See Kolstad, 119 
S.Ct.at2I25 . 
. 
34 Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2127 . Justice O'Connor stated that this "issue is intimately bound up 
with the preceding discussion on the evidentiary showing necessary to qualify for a punitive 
award, and it is easily subsumed within the question on which we granted certiorari . . .. " /d. at 
2I27. 
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those decisions are contrary to the employer's "good-faith efforts to 
comply with Title VII."35 The Court applied modified agency princi-
ples to its analysis of employer liability for punitive damages. The 
Court first examined traditional agency principles, which allow a prin-
cipal to be held vicariously liable for the actions of its agent when the 
agent "was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the 
scope of employment."36 The Court observed that acting in the "scope 
of employment" can include intentional torts involving conduct that 
the employee "is employed to perform, that occur substantially within 
the authorized time and space limits, and is actuated, at least in part, 
by a purpose to serve the employer."37 The Court reasoned that these 
broad guidelines would cause an employer who "makes every effort to 
comply with Title VII" to be held liable for the discriminatory em-
ployment decisions of managerial agents.38 
The Court found that this outcome, however, was in tension with 
both the purposes of Title VII and the principles underlying common 
law limitations on vicarious liability for punitive damages39 because it 
would "reduce the incentive for employers to implement antidiscrimi-
nation programs," a result directly contrary to the "purposes underly-
ing Title VII."40 The Court based this conclusion on its belief that Ti-
tle VII was "designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms."41 The Court argued that 
holding all employers vicariously liable for punitive damages for the 
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents would have 
a chilling effect on the implementation of antidiscrimination programs 
and policies. The Court reasoned that the existence of an antidis-
crimination program would lead a court to believe that the employer 
was aware of Title VII's requirements. Therefore, any violation of Ti-
tle VII would automatically constitute acting with malice or reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of the plaintiff, thus satis-
fying the standard for punitive liability. Under this reasoning, em-
ployers would have a disincentive to implement antidiscrimination 
programs because it could lead to automatic liability. 42 
35 ld. at 2129 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.Jd 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(Tate!,]., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 /d. at 2128 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 217C (1958)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
37 /d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
38 /d. 
39 See id. at 2128-29. 
40 /d. 
41 /d. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Cl 2257, 2270 (1998)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
42 See id. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from 
the Court's rejection of the egregiousness requirement, arguing that 
such a requirement is implied in Congress's two-tiered scheme for 
monetary relief.43 The Chief Justice concurred, however, in the 
Court's application of modified agency principles to limit an em-
ployer's vicarious liability for punitive damages.44 
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. 45 He con-
curred in the Court's decision to reject an egregiousness requirement 
for punitive damages.46 Finding that the vicarious liability issue was 
not properly before the Court, Justice Stevens dissented from the 
Court's holding regarding that issue.47 Justice Stevens argued that the 
vicarious liability issue was not properly before the Court because the 
facts of the case did not present that issue and the parties had not 
briefed it.48 Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the agency issue 
was not applicable to this case.49 Promotion decisions are "quintessen-
tial company acts," he argued, and therefore there is no need to use 
agency principles to impute the promotion decision to the employer.50 
Given the plain language of the 1991 Act and Congress's intent, the 
Court's primary holding - that plaintiffs need not demonstrate egre-
giousness to obtain punitive damages- is correct.51 The Court's de-
cision that certain employers cannot be vicariously liable for punitive 
damages, however, is mistaken. The Court stated that the primary ob-
jective of Title VII is to prevent unlawful discrimination52 and that 
this purpose is adequately advanced when employers are encouraged 
to adopt antidiscrimination policies.53 The Court's holding, however, 
assumed that employer antidiscrimination policies are the only means 
of preventing discrimination. According to this view, if punitive li-
ability threatens these preventive measures - as the Court insisted it 
does - then punitive liability cannot be extended because it would 
leave no way to prevent unlawful discrimination. Yet both Title VII 
and the 1991 Act deliberately rely on alternative preventative meas-
43 See id. at 2130 (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
44 See id. 
45 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
46 See Kolstad, II9 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 2133 . 
49 See id. 
so Id. (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
51 Although Congress intended the standard for punitive damages to be higher than the stan-
dard for ordinary liability, Congress clearly meant the higher standard to be malice or reckless 
indifference, as stated in the language of section 198ta(b)(r). See id. at 2124; H.R REP. No. I02-
40, pt. I, at 72 (1991); supra note 14 (describing the standard for ordinary liability). 
52 See Kolstad, II9 S. Ct. at 2129. 
53 See id. 
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ures. Congress recognized, in 1964 and again in 1991, that remedial 
procedures can serve as effective deterrent mechanisms for preventing 
unlawful discrimination. 54 
In 1991, Congress believed that punitive damages would serve as a 
more effective deterrent for unlawful discrimination than the existing 
equitable remedies.55 Congressional findings indicated that the avail-
able equitable remedies were "not adequate to deter unlawful dis-
crimination. "56 In an attempt to effectuate the deterrent purpose of 
Title VII, Congress made compensatory and punitive damages avail-
able to victims of unlawful discrimination under the 1991 Act.57 Con-
gress believed that liability for monetary relief was critical for realizing 
the deterrent purpose of Title VII, reasoning that if discrimination is 
expensive, people will stop engaging in discriminatory behavior.58 
Allowing employers to escape vicarious punitive liability un-
dermines the deterrent effect that imposing punitive liability was 
intended to have under the 1991 Act.59 Because individuals are 
generally not personally liable for punitive damages and employer vi-
carious liability for punitive damages has been limited by Kolstad, few 
people will be deterred by the threat of punitive damages.60 Although 
there are other mechanisms that encourage adherence to Title 
VII, the pre-1991 deterrent mechanisms have dearly not been 
successful from Congress's perspective.61 
In deciding the vicarious liability question, the Kolstad Court ex-
amined the effect of such liability on employers' adoption of antidis-
crimination policies. The Court thus focused its inquiry too narrowly; 
it should have examined the effect of vicarious liability on the broader 
deterrent purpose of Title VII and the 1991 Act. The deterrent pur-
pose of these laws extends beyond encouraging employers to adopt an-
tidiscrimination policies to preventing employers from engaging in 
unlawful discrimination. Had the Court examined the effect of vicari-
54 See Civil Rights Act of I964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-2oooe-I7 (I994); Civil Rights Act of I99I, 
42 U.S.C. § I9Sia (I994). 
55 Compensatory and punitive damages were already available in I99I for intentional dis-
crimination based on race but were not available for discrimination based on religion or sex. See 
H.R. REP. NO. I02-40, pt. I, at 65 . 
56 I d. at IS. 
57 See 42 U.S.C. § I9Sia (I994). 
58 See H.R. REP. No. I02-40, pt. I, at 69. 
59 The deterrent effect of punitive damages is similar to the deterrent effect of general pun-
ishment. When individuals understand that they may become subject to a particular punishment 
- for example, punitive damages - for taking a certain action, fear of punishment will generally 
deter them from that action. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (6th ed. I990). 
60 See Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on 
Individual Title VII Liability, IS OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 475, 49o-92 (I993). 
61 See H.R. REP. No. I02-40, pt. I, at IS ("[E]xisting [civil rights] protections and remedies are 
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination."). 
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ous liability on the prevention of unlawful discrimination - the 
broader purpose of Title Vll - it would have seen that holding em-
ployers vicariously liable for punitive damages would not have under-
mined, but instead would have furthered, the deterrent purposes of Ti-
tle vn and the 1991 Act. Potential liability for punitive damages 
would encourage employers to take the steps necessary to adhere to Ti-
tle Vll. Limiting the potential for punitive liability leaves employers 
with the pre-1991 incentives to adhere to Title vn - the incentives 
that Congress deemed inadequate. 
Although the Court did not define what constitutes a good-faith ef-
fort to comply, the resulting standard is likely too low to gauge ade-
quately an employer's attempt to comply with Title Vll. Law firms 
advising employers about the Kolstad ruling have stated: "As an em-
ployer, you can breathe a bit easier -you don't have to worry quite 
as much about large punitive damage awards if you've adopted and 
implemented antidiscrimination policies."62 The employment law 
newsletters also state, however, that making a good-faith effort under 
Kolstad requires, at a minimum, having antidiscrimination policies in 
place that are regularly and consistently used.63 In Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores,64 the Tenth Circuit re-
cently applied the Kolstad ruling and measured the defendant-
employer's good-faith effort by the existence of an antidiscrimination 
policy. 65 The Tenth Circuit held that although the defendant-employer 
had a generalized policy of equality, it had not educated its employees 
on the requirements of the federal law involved and therefore its gen-
eral policy did not constitute a good-faith effort to comply.66 Unfortu-
nately this decision did not provide more guidance as to what consti-
tutes a good-faith effort because the facts did not even meet the 
minimum requirements.67 As is evident in the advice from the em-
ployment law newsletters and the holding in Wal-Mart Stores, employ-
ers will only be concerned with having regularly and consistently used 
antidiscrimination policies and employee education regarding the ap-
62 High Court Ends Tel"m with Important Rulings on ADA, Punitive Damages, PA. 
EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER (Buchanan Ingersoll), July 1999, at 4 [HEREINAFTER, High Court, 
Pa.]; accord High Court Ends Tel"m with Important Rulings on ADA, Punitive Damages, N.H. 
EMPLOYMENT L . LETTER (Sulloway & Hollis), August 1999, at 6 [HEREINAFTER, High Court, 
N.H.]. These law firms also stated, however, that employers could not turn a blind eye to em-
ployee actions once the policies were in place; rather, it would be necessary for employers to en-
sure that their policies were being applied. See High Court, Pa. at 4; High Court, N.H. at 6. 
63 See High Court, Pa. at 4i High Court, N.H. at 6. 
64 No. 98-2015, 98-2030, 1999 WL 638210 (roth Cir. 1999). 
65 See id. at •7. 
66 See id. 
67 The defendant did not meet the minimum requirement of personnel education regarding 
federal rights. 
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plicable federal laws, and will not be as interested in taking the neces-
sary action to ensure that their employees do not unlawfully discrimi-
nate. 
By focusing on the existence of antidiscrimination policies as evi-
dence of an employer's good-faith effort to comply with Title Vll, the 
Court has chosen an unreliable indicator. Modern employment dis-
crimination is generally covert, 68 and antidiscrimination policies may 
not be indicative of an employer's effort to comply with Title Vll. 
The employment law newsletters' insistence that the policies are regu-
larly and consistently used is an attempt to address this concern, yet 
such policies do not gauge important subtle factors that affect an em-
ployer's compliance efforts. Subtle factors include supervisors' re-
vealing their attitudes about the seriousness of discrimination matters 
through verbal and non-verbal innuendoes, employees noticing that 
filed complaints are never positively resolved, and the reactions of su-
pervisors and management to individuals that use the policies. Be-
cause these factors would be difficult to document when attempting to 
rebut an employer's claim that its regularly and consistently used anti-
discrimination policies represent a good-faith effort to comply, it would 
be hard to determine an employer's true effort to comply with Title 
vn. 
The Court based its decision on the idea that the best way to in-
duce compliance with Title vn is to provide employers with positive 
incentives. This opinion conflicts with Congress's decision that the 
best way to induce Title Vll compliance is by providing a negative in-
centive- punishment- to those who engage in intentional discrimi-
nation.69 The difference in the two liability regimes is the amount of 
effort that employers will make to comply with Title Vll by preventing 
unlawful discrimination. Under the regime the Court established in 
Kolstad, employers will be interested in establishing antidiscrimination 
policies with two components: a component indicating that it is not 
company policy to discriminate against individuals on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and a component detailing 
a procedure for addressing claims of discrimination. Alternatively, if 
the Court had allowed employers to be vicariously liable for punitive 
damages, then employers would institute antidiscrimination policies 
that actively ensure compliance with Title Vll and ensure that em-
68 See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: 
The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1644 (1991) (discussing the covert nature of 
employment discrimination); Marina C. Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive 
in Title VII Disparate 1Yeatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1114, 1116 
(1988) (same). 
69 See H .R. REP. No. 102-40, pl 1, at 69-70. 
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ployers seriously address potential violations. 70 By making punitive 
damages available to victims of intentional employment discrimina-
tion, Congress intended to do more than to ask employers to try to 
comply with Title vn - it intended to punish them if they failed to 
comply. 
If the Court was interested in providing a positive incentive for Ti-
tle Vll compliance without undermining the deterrent effect of puni-
tive damages, it could have adopted a rule similar to the rule adopted 
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth11 and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton12 governing employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harass-
ment. Employers would be vicariously liable for punitive damages 
subject to an affirmative defense, enabling employers who exercise 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly discriminatory be-
havior to escape vicarious liability for punitive damages. 73 The Kol-
stad rule presumably places the burden of proving that an employer 
did not make a good-faith effort on the plaintiff. If employers bear the 
burden of proving reasonable care or a good-faith effort to avoid oth-
erwise automatic punitive liability, employers would have a stronger 
incentive to take the actions necessary to prevent unlawful discrimina-
tion in their workplaces. The incentive would be stronger because 
employers would face the more difficult task of proving that they took 
reasonable care or made a good-faith effort to comply, rather than es-
caping liability because the plaintiff could not prove that the discrimi-
natory behavior did not comport with the employer's good-faith effort. 
Both Title Vll and the 1991 Act were enacted to prevent unlawful 
discrimination and each used different types of deterrent mechanisms. 
Had the Kolstad Court appreciated the broader purpose of both laws, 
it would have seen that holding employers vicariously liable for puni-
tive damages would not have undermined the purpose of Title VII. In 
fact, the Court would have concluded that it was only by holding em-
ployers vicariously liable for punitive damages that courts could spur 
employers to work tirelessly to prevent unlawful discrimination in 
their workplaces. 
2. Title IX - School District Liability for Student-on-Student 
Sexual Harassment. - Enacted to eliminate gender discrimination in 
70 Cf H.R REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70 (implying that employers take active measures to pre-
vent employment discrimination only when there is "increased liability"). 
71 II8 s. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
72 II8 s. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
73 In Burlington Industries and Faragher the Court decided that employers would be vicari-
ously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment unless they demonstrated two things: first, that 
the employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior"; and second, "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 
Burlington Indus., u8 S. Ct. at 2270; accord Faragher, u8 S. Ct. at 2292-93. 
